

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-05

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FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8919

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USNATO 761

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 2502

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, CSCS

SUBJECT: NATO AMBASSADORS ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION

REF: A. USNATO 5228; B. USNATO 5150

1. AT SEPT 25 NATO AMBASSADORS LUNCH DISCUSSION MAINLY CONCERNED CSCE IMPLEMENTATION. SOME AMBASSADORS HAD BEEN TOLD BY FONMIN CHNOUPEK THAT STUDY AND SORTING OUT OF CZECHOSLOVAK POSITIONS ON SPECIFICS WOULD TAKE SOME TIME, AND THE GENERAL FEELING WAS THAT THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WERE STILL FORMULATING POSITIONS, WITHOUT MUCH OF AN EFFORT YET TO ACHIEVE COORDINATION. SOME THOUGHT IT WAS POSSIBLE THE FORTHCOMING GROMYKO VISIT TO PRAGUE WOULD CONCERN (AMONG OTHER THINGS) THIS
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COORDINATION IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET POST-HELSINKI

POLICY.

2. MOST AMBASSADORS AGREED THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAD BEEN TAKEN SOMEWHAT OFF GUARD BY VIGOR OF THE WEST'S FOLLOW-UP TO CSCE, PARTICULARLY IN NOTIFYING OF MILITARY MANEUVERS AND INVITING OBSERVERS. WAR-SAW PACT POWERS DID NOT RELISH IDEA OF RECIPROCITY, BUT WOULD NOT WANT TO BE ACCUSED OF ACTUALLY VIOLATING HELSINKI FINAL ACT. (THUS THEY HAD REPORTEDLY, ACCORDING TO FRG AMBASSADOR, CUT PARTICIPANTS IN RECENT MANEUVERS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY 1,000 MEN IN ORDER NOT TO BE AT NOTIFICATION LEVEL.) SOME FELT THAT RECENT STAGING OF MILITARY BRIDGE-CROSSING FOR PRAGUE MILITARY MOD COULD HAVE BEEN DONE AT LEAST PARTLY TO BUILD UP RECORD OF "DOING SOMETHING- IN THE MILITARY FIELD. IN THIS AS IN OTHER AREAS, SOME AMBASSADORS COMBINED SKEPTICISM ABOUT ANY BIG BREAKTHROUGHS WITH CAUTIOUS HOPE THAT EASTERN COUNTRIES WOULD BE INDUCED TO MAKE GESTURES IN VARIOUS FIELDS THAT, TAKEN TOGETHER, MIGHT BE MEANINGFUL OVER LONG TERM.

3. ANOTHER EXAMPLE WAS DIVIDED FAMILIES. BRITISH REPORTED RECEIVING NOTE SEPT 8 FROM MFA TURNING DOWN TEN DIVIDED FAMILY REQUESTS (SOME FOR VISITS, SOME FOR REUNIFICATION) ON GROUNDS MEMBER OF FAMILY IN BRITAIN IN EACH CASE LEFT USSR ILLEGALLY. NO ONE REPORTED ANY UPTURN IN DIVIDED FAMILY REUNIFICATION SINCE HELSINKI. HOWEVER, FRG AMBASSADOR SAID IT WAS TOO EARLY TO TELL, AND EXPRESSED CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM ABOUT LONG TERM. HE CITED SEVERAL CASES THEY KNOW OF WHERE APPLICANTS FOR EXIT VISAS SENT IN COPY OF RUDE PRÁVO BEARING TEXT OF HELSINKI FINAL ACT WITH RELEVANT PASSAGE MARKED IN RED. DANISH AMB MELLBIN, WHO WAS DENMARK'S REPRESENTATIVE AT CSCE, SAID HE THOUGHT IN DIVIDED FAMILY FIELD AS IN SOME OTHERS, FINAL ACT DID PROVIDE BASIS FOR BILATERAL REPRESENTATIONS WHICH DID NOT EXIST BEFORE HELSINKI; HE FELT CZECHS AND OTHERS WOULD NOT WANT TO BE FOUND IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF FINAL ACT

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AT BELGRADE IN 1977, THEREFORE HE THOUGHT AFTER SOME TIME PROGRESS WOULD BE REGISTERED. SOME OTHERS SHARED THIS GUARDED HOPE.

4. SIMILARLY, IN FIELD OF JOURNALISM/INFORMATION SOME HOPE WAS EXPRESSED THAT LIMITED POSITIVE STEPS COULD BE REGISTERED. US CHARGE, WHO WAS HOST, CITED CONVERSATIONS WITH MFA IN WHICH FINAL ACT

WAS QUOTED TO SUPPORT VISA REQUEST FOR VISITING JOURNALIST. CHARGE ALSO REPORTED THAT SEPT 24 ZANTOVSKY (HEAD SIXTH DEPT MFA) HAD GIVEN "BACKGROUND BRIEFING" FOR FOREIGN AND SOCIALIST PRESS AT MFA ON CZECH RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES HE COVERS (US, UK, CANADA). CHARGE SAID THIS IS FIRST KNOWN INSTANCE OF SUCH OPEN BRIEFING, AND IT COULD BE PARTLY IN RESPONSE TO HELSINKI.

5. DUE NOTE WAS TAKEN OF STRIDENT CRITICISM OF WEST (AND NATO IN PARTICULAR) FOR ACTING CONTRARY TO SPIRIT OF HELSINKI FINAL ACT. SOME FELT THIS WAS PARTLY IN RESPONSE TO POPULAR DENIGRATION OF CSCE IN WEST, BUT MOST THOUGHT THAT COMMUNIST IDEOLOGICAL TYPES WOULD COME TO FORE AFTER HELSINKI AND USE FINAL ACT AS STICK TO BEAT WEST ON ANY ISSUE WHICH INVOLVED STANDING UP TO THE EAST. CRITICISM OF MANEUVERS WAS OBVIOUS EXAMPLE. GERMAN AMB ALSO CITED STRONN PRESS AND DIPLOMATIC ATTACKS ON FRG OVER RECENT HELICOPTER INCIDENT. (GERMANS HAVE TOLD US PRIVATELY THEY FEEL ONE IMPULSION BEHIND AIOLENCE OF ATTACKS WAS BUILDING UP NEGATIVE RECORD E AS TO COUNTER FRG REQUESTS FOR PROGRESS IN HUMANI-TARIAN FIELD.)

6. COMMENT. NATO AMBASSADORS HERE ARE OBVIOUSLY STILL ASSESSING WHAT HELSINKI MAY MEAN IN CONCRETE TERMS. FROM THIS DISCUSSION, IT APPEARS THAT THEY DO NOT DISMISS IT AS INSIGNIFICANT, BUT FEEL THERE ARE AREAS WHERE THE FINAL ACT MAY HELP THE WEST ELICIT SOME GREATER DEGREE OF COOPERATION THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT HELSINKI. IT ALSO APPEARS THAT WITH OPINIONS STILL BEING FORMED--

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AND PARTICULARLY WITH THE CZECHOSLOVAKS AND OTHER COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS STILL FORMULATING THEIR VIEWS--THE TIME IS PARTICULARLY RIPE FOR EXTENSIVE ALLIANCE CONSULTATION IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AN ACTIVE RATHER THAN A PASSIVE FOLLOW-UP POLICY TO HELSINKI IN THE W VT. IF THIS LUNCHEON DISUCSSION IS ILLUSTRATIVE, OUR ALLIES HAVE NOT GOT FAR ENOUGH IN THEIR POST-CSCE POLICY-MAKING TO SEND CONCRETE INSTRUCTIONS OUT TO THEIR POSTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. IF THE US CAN OFFER SPECIFIC ACTION GUIDELINES FOR MAKING USE OF CSCE, AND PRESENT THEM IN NATO AND BILATERALLY (NOT FOR UNIFORM NATO ACTION BUT BY WAY OF EXAMPLE), WE SHOULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE UPON THE WAY OUR ALLIES DEVELOP THEIR POST-CSCE POLICY. THE DISCUSSIONS THUS FAR IN NATO

WOULD SEEM TO BE AN EXCELLENT BEGINNING TO THIS
PROCESS.
PERRY

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